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Accountability of Multinational
Corporations: The Barriers Presented by
Concepts of the Corporate
Juridical Entity
BY PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG*
Introduction
Large multinational corporations have come to dominate the
national and global economic scene. The scale of their operations is
enormous. The largest have grown into enterprises of astonishing
magnitude that in their economic dimensions are fully comparable to
nation states. Imposing adequate controls over multinational conduct
and achieving accountability by multinationals for their conduct both
at home and abroad should be a major objective of every
industrialized power.
Such a process has been underway for almost three quarters of a
century starting with the beginnings of the corporate responsibility
movement of the 1920s.1 It proceeds on many fronts in addition to
law: the market, the climate of opinion, codes of conduct and other
forms of self-regulation, and moral pressures. National law,
international trade conventions, and international law itself also play
a role, still minor, but of increasing significance. Of these efforts to
regulate overseas activities of multinational corporations, the
international progress in dealing with foreign corrupt practices,
focusing on bribes and political contributions, is the outstanding
* Dean and Professor of Law and Business, Emeritus at University,
Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Harvard; J.D., Harvard; LL.D. (hon.),
Connecticut. Professor Blumberg has published ten books dealing with corporate
groups and corporate accountability. Copyright, The Blumberg Trust, 2001. All
rights reserved.
1. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
(1972).
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success. It is a success in which the United States with its
pathbreaking Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can take justifiable
pride.2
While activism in these areas has had numerous other successes
and gives promise of further success, my assigned role requires me to
sidestep discussion of this area of growing importance. Instead, my
presentation deals with the inherent limitations of the American legal
system (and of other Western legal systems as well) in achieving
corporate accountability on the international level and in effectively
enforcing legal restraints on corporate behavior abroad. These
fundamental structural problems largely arise from the widespread
use by American and other multinational parent corporations of
foreign-owned subsidiary corporations to conduct the overseas
business of the enterprise.'
The focus of the conference is "Holding Multinational
Corporations Responsible under International Law." The creation or
recognition of legal obligations of multinational corporations,
whether under national or international law, is only the first step.
Where contested, such obligations must be enforced through the
courts. Where the conduct under challenge has been committed
overseas by foreign-owned subsidiaries of the American corporate
group, it is distressing to discover that the American legal system
presents inherent barriers that make achieving "the day of
accountability in court" all too often illusory.
This, then, is my role: to explore in the limited time and space
available the inadequacies of the American legal system in enforcing
legal obligations of multinational corporations. The major source of
the problem arises from the ancient concept of the corporate juridical
entity that, particularly in the case of large public corporations,
departs sharply from the economic reality of modem business
enterprise. As I have explored at length elsewhere, the limitations
inherent in traditional concepts of entity law present a major
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, dd-2, 781, 78o (1994). See infra text accompanying notes
69 to 71.
3. The United Nations Transnational Corporations and Management Division
once estimated that there were 35,000 multinational corporations with 170,000
foreign affiliates. They were highly concentrated with the largest 100 multinationals
(excluding those in banking and finance) having assets of about $3.1 trillion, of which
$1.2 trillion were outside their home countries. Of the largest fifty ranked by asset
size, thirteen were American, seven were French, six were Japanese, five were
German, and four were British or Anglo-Dutch. Bill Emmott, Survey, Multinationals
- Back in Fashion, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 5-6.
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challenge to national corporation law and to international law.4
Achieving accountability over American multinational
corporations for the overseas activities of their subsidiary
corporations faces two other serious problems in addition to the
barriers presented by traditional corporate jurisprudence. The first
arises from the considerable barriers to achieving jurisdiction in
American courts over foreign subsidiaries of American multinational
groups. This pushes counsel to sue their American parent
corporation instead. While this may solve the jurisdictional problem,
it does so at the high cost of the difficulties of establishing either the
vicarious liability of the parent corporation for the actions of the
subsidiary or the direct participation of the parent in the activity
complained of.
Secondly, even when jurisdiction may be achieved over the
foreign parent or subsidiary corporation, courts have discretionary
authority to decline to hear the case. This is the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. It presents a further formidable obstacle to litigation
seeking an American adjudication of allegedly wrongful conduct
abroad injuring foreign plaintiffs, whether brought against the
American multinational parent corporation, or one of its foreign
subsidiaries.
Both of these procedural problems are major problems for
international litigation and deserve careful examination. However, in
view of the limited time and space available, this essay can deal only
with the barriers of traditional corporation law to the imposition of
substantive liability on multinational parents for the acts of their
subsidiaries, particularly foreign subsidiaries.
I. The Confines of Traditional Entity Law
The legal systems of the Western world as developed many
centuries ago focus on individuals and their rights and liabilities. In
4. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, including
volumes reviewing problems of parent and subsidiary corporations in PROCEDURAL
LAW (1983) [hereinafter LCG-I]; BANKRUPTCY LAW (1985) [hereinafter LCG-II];
SUBSTANTIVE LAW (1987) [hereinafter LCG-III]; STATUTORY LAW: GENERAL (1989)
[hereinafter LCG-IV]; STATUTORY LAW: SPECIFIC (1992) (with Kurt A. Strasser)
[hereinafter LCG-V]; STATUTORY LAW: STATE (1995) (with Kurt A. Strasser)
[hereinafter LCG-VI]; and ENTERPRISE LAW IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS (1998)
(with Kurt A. Strasser) [hereinafter LCG-VII]; and PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW (1992) [hereinafter
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE].
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relatively recent times, they have been adapted imperfectly to deal
with the legal problems of corporate organizations, particularly
complex corporate organizations.
The crucial question faced by the law is the attribution of the
conduct under examination to the particular actor responsible for it.
With individuals, this presents no conceptual problems, only
problems of fact. Under the traditional concept, each individual is a
separate juridical entity with his own rights and duties. When the
small corporation is similarly conceived as a separate juridical entity
with its rights and duties separate from those of its shareholder or
shareholders, this theoretical foundation is sorely strained; and when
applied to the complex corporate structure of the large multinational
enterprise, it breaks down. The legal system that could largely
resolve the legal problems presented by the early period of the
Industrial Revolution is incapable in its traditional form of dealing
effectively with the problems of the multi-tiered multinational
corporate group functioning with a parent corporation, sub-holding
companies, and scores or hundreds of subsidiary corporations
organized under the laws of countries around the globe.
To grasp fully the severe jurisprudential limitations of traditional
corporation law, a brief historical review is desirable. The imposition
of effective legal control on all elements of the large corporations
dominant in the national and world economies of the modem world
faces serious obstacles by reason of the anachronistic nature of
traditional corporation law. This traditional law arose from the
efforts of English judges to formulate a law of corporations based on
medieval concepts of Roman law for municipal corporations and
church institutions: areas without commercial significance and
institutions very remote indeed from business corporations in general
and modern large corporations in particular. When English business
corporations arose, the early law developed for municipal
corporations became the model for the fledgling business
corporations Thus, Coke's famous definition of the nature of the
corporation in 1612 was written at a time when there were virtually
no business corporations in England.' However, almost two centuries
later, it served as the foundation of Blackstone's description of the
5. BLUMBERG, MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 379; BLUMBERG,
LCG-III, supra note 4, §1.03.
6. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 250a (London, W. Clarke, 1st ed.
1628); Case of Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 970-71, 973 (1612).
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corporation7 and was subsequently adopted by Chief Justice Marshall
in his celebrated opinions in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux and
the Dartmouth College case.'
The traditional corporation law rests on the concept of the
separate corporate juridical personality. It is the doctrine that a
corporation and its shareholders are separate juridical entities and
that the corporation's rights and liabilities are separate and distinct
from the rights and liabilities of its shareholders. This is entity law.
This jurisprudential doctrine of the separate corporate
personality with such unlikely roots provides the foundation for
American corporation law governing multinational corporations
today. It has been strongly buttressed by an entirely different
concept, a political concept. This is the concept of limited liability.
Limited liability, not the jurisprudential concept of separate juridical
personality, dominates the discussion today.
At the outset, it is important to understand that limited liability is
an entirely different doctrine9 arising as a result of the pressures on
the growing corporations of the first half of the nineteenth century to
raise the capital required to take advantage of the emerging
technology of the times. It was a matter of protracted political
struggle before limited liability was accepted by Northeastern
legislatures, climaxing in its adoption by Massachusetts in 1830, but
with isolated pockets of unlimited liability continuing until the mid-
1850s, except for in California which retained unlimited liability in its
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 467-68,
470,472,478 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1st ed. 1765).
8. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86-91 (1809);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
9. Although shareholders were not directly liable to corporate creditors for the
debts of the corporation, they were subject to indirect liability in the form of
leviations or assessments by corporations to raise the funds to satisfy debts. Further,
the House of Lords in 1671, followed a century and one half later by American
courts, upheld the right of corporate creditors to obtain equitable relief to compel a
corporation to levy assessments on shareholders necessary to pay the corporate
debts. Salmon v. Hamborough Co., 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (H.L. 1671); Hume v. Winyaw
& Wando Canal Co., 1 Carolina L.J. 217 (1830). See Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow. 387,
395-96 (N.Y. 1826); Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456, 493, 499 (N.Y. 1822); cf.
Commonwealth v. Blue-Hill Tpk. Corp., 5 Mass. 420,426 (1809).
Thus, separate personality did not mean limited liability so long as the customary
form of stock subscription contract between the corporation and stockholders was
subject to stockholder assessments. After the customary form provided that shares
were being issued as fully paid and non-assessable, shareholder liability (in the
absence of statutory assessment provisions) ceased with the payment of the original
subscription price.
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constitution until 1930.10
Limited liability was seen as advantageous because it separated
the investor from exposure to responsibility for corporate debts
beyond the amount of his or her investment." It arose at a time when
except by special act of the legislature never given in the case of
manufacturing corporations, a corporation could not own the stock of
another corporation. Corporate groups and holding companies were
impossible, and remained imp6ssible for half a century. Only when
New Jersey amended its corporation laws around 1890 to authorize
intercompany stock ownership for all corporations and other states
promptly followed suit, did corporate groups become possible. 3
Giant American corporations such as United States Steel, Standard
Oil of New Jersey, and American Sugar Company speedily emerged,
and an increasing concentration of American industry began. The
trust device had been struck down earlier by the courts as against
public policy, 4 but corporate groups provided a lawful alternative
route.
The crucial significance of this development for our purposes is
that no court, then or since, in a case involving the legal responsibility
of a parent corporation for the acts of its subsidiary has examined as a
matter of first consideration whether the doctrine of limited
10. New York (1811), New Hampshire (1816), New Jersey (1816), and Maine
(1823) led the way. After Massachusetts, the leading industrialized state, adopted
general limited liability in 1830, limited liability became generally accepted in the
United States. However, unlimited liability continued in a handful of states until the
1850s, and remarkably, unlimited liability in California survived until the 1930s. CAL.
CONST. of 1879, art. XII, § 3 (repealed 1930); CAL. CIV. CODE § 322 (repealed 1932).
See BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 4, §1.05.
The English experience was somewhat different. Liability limitation precipitated
an extended political struggle, before limited liability prevailed in 1859. H.A.
Shannon, The Coming of General Limited Liability, 6 ECON. HIST. 267 (1931). See
generally BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 4, § 1.03.
11. During the nineteenth century, general limited liability was not complete. In
most states either by statute or constitution, shareholders continued to be liable for
double or even triple assessments on their shares to pay corporate debts. See 1 C.
BEACH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 675 n.1 (8th ed.
1926). In the case of banks, double liability continued until the 1930s and the advent
of federal deposit insurance. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 23, 38 Stat. 251, 373 (1913)
(amended 1933 and 1935) (repealed 1959).
12. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 566, 589 (1933).
13. Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385-86; Act of Apr. 17, 1888,
ch. 295, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 445-46; Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, §4, 1889 N.J. Laws
412, 414; Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, § 2, 1893 N.J. Laws 301.
14. People v. N. River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582 (1890); State ex rel. v.
Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137 (1892).
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liability-developed to protect investors from the debts of the
enterprise-also shielded the parent from liability for the debts of a
subsidiary. Unlike the investors in the parent corporation itself who
were solely investors, the parent corporation was instead part of the
business enterprise engaged along with its subsidiary in the collective
conduct of the business under the parent's control. Further, it
provided a second layer of limited liability with the parent insulated
from the debts of the subsidiaries as well as the ultimate investors in
the enterprise insulated from the debts of the parent corporation and
the enterprise. In the typical multi-tiered multinational group in the
modem economy, this has resulted in three, four, or even five or
more separate layers of limited liability.
Instead of inquiring whether this dramatic change required a
fresh consideration and possible limitation of the doctrine, the courts,
then and since, have automatically applied concepts and policies
designed to separate investors from liability for the risks of the
business to protect as well each of the upper-tier companies of the
enterprise from liability for the debts incurred by their lower-tier
subsidiaries in conducting the common business of the group.
In the modern world, parent corporations operate multinational
groups of enormous dimensions through multi-tiered corporate
structures of "incredible complexity"' 5 composed of dozens or
hundreds of subsidiaries organized under the laws of scores of
countries collectively conducting assigned segments of a single
business under the "control" of the parent corporation. To the public
and to economists, the multinational corporation is a single
enterprise, "the firm." However, the law sees the multinational, such
as British Petroleum with its tiers of sub-holding companies and more
than 1,200 subsidiaries,'16 as 1,200-odd separate independent entities.
Under the traditional legal view, each of these intertwined segments
of the British Petroleum enterprise is a separate juridical entity, with
its own legal duties and liabilities separate and distinct from its parent
corporation and affiliates under whose direction it is conducting its
fragment of the common business being collectively conducted with
the other members of the group. This is entity law. It is a legal
conception that is manifestly anachronistic and bears no resemblance
to the economic reality.
Traditional entity law treating each subsidiary in this manner as a
15. Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 271,274 (1984).
16. Id. at 271.
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separate legal actor, distinct from its parent corporation and affiliates,
creates a fundamental barrier to the imposition of liability, both
under common law and under statutory law, upon parent and
affiliates for the activities of a subsidiary of the group. It lends itself
to widespread strategic use to evade common law and statutory
policies.
Direct liability on the part of the dominant parent corporation
for the actions of its subservient subsidiary companies can arise, of
course, if it directly participates in the acts complained of. However,
as a result of the limitations of entity law, vicarious liability may arise
only through one or the other of two rigorously restricted doctrines.
One is the equitable doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil," the
other is the common-law concept of agency law. Unfortunately,
neither provides an adequate solution in the overwhelming number of
cases.
A. Piercing the Veil
Under the traditional formulations, 7 "piercing" has rigorous
17. Virtually all state jurisdictions in the United States subscribe to one of the
two traditional formulations of "piercing the veil jurisprudence": the three factor
"instrumentality doctrine" and the "alter ego" doctrine. Despite the literal
differences, the two doctrines are widely regarded as essentially interchangeable.
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d
Cir. 1991) (quoting the author); Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
The "instrumentality doctrine" requires "excessive control," wrongful or
inequitable conduct, and causal relationship to the plaintiff's loss. A common
formulation is:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but
complete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business
practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit
fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other
positive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of the
plaintiff's legal rights; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd,
6 N.E.2d 56 (1936) (emphasis omitted).
The common formulation of the "alter ego" doctrine provides that it is
applicable (1) when such "unity of ownership and interest" exists that the two
affiliated corporations have ceased to be separate and the subsidiary has been
relegated to the status of the "alter ego" of the parent; and (2) where recognition of
[Vol. 24:297
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prerequisites that present formidable hurdles. It is an equitable
remedy that is available only in "rare" or "exceptional"
circumstances.
Its first requirement is a demonstration that the subsidiary lacks
separate independent identity of its own. Such lack of separate
identity may arise in two ways: excessive "control" by the parent and
lack of the forms of separate existence. 8
First, it may arise from an excessive exercise by the parent of its
control over the management, operation, and decision-making of the
subsidiary eliminating any independent role for the officers and
directors of the subsidiary. All courts agree that "control" arising
from 100 percent stock ownership and common identity of the
parent's and the subsidiary's officers and directors is insufficient.19 In
addition, led by the Supreme Court, the courts have generally
accepted a concept of parent/subsidiary relationships that are
"perfectly consistent with the norms of corporate behavior," which
are similarly deemed insufficient to satisfy the "control" requirement
for "piercing." These include broad areas of subsidiary decision-
making, including oversight and monitoring of subsidiary
performance; determination of the subsidiary's general policies,
practices, and procedures; capital budgets; executive salaries; and
financing." Although disputed, many courts applying "piercing"
jurisprudence insist that the parent's participation in the management
them as separate entities would sanction fraud or lead to an inequitable result. E.g.,
RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1985) (California law);
Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc., 333 P.2d 802 (Cal. Ct. App.
1958).
Federal law generally follows the state model. However, the Second Circuit is an
exception. In federal matters, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
significantly relaxed the traditional doctrine to "pierce" whenever either lack of
separate identity or wrongful or inequitable abuse can be established. E.g., Carte
Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1993); Win.
Passalacqua Builders, Inc., 933 F.2d 131. Until corrected by the New York Court of
Appeals, it even applied this significant departure from the three factor
"instrumentality" doctrine to diversity matters controlled by New York law. Morris
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160-61 (N.Y. 1993).
18. Although it is clear that either of these two alternative routes will satisfy the
lack of separate identity prerequisite for "piercing," the traditional formulations
overlook this complexity.
19. See United States v. Jon-T Chems, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating "we maintain the [hats] fiction"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986); Steven v.
Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963); Kingston Dry Dock
Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
20. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
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of the subsidiary must extend to day-to-day decisions before
"piercing" is appropriate." In the classic doctrinal formulation,
''control" must extend to the extreme where "the subsidiary has no
mind, will, or existence of its own.
22
The prerequisite of demonstration of the lack of separate
identity may also be demonstrated by the extent of the reality of its
business operations and even by matters of form. Does the subsidiary
have separate books and records? Has it complied with corporate
formalities with respect to meetings of its shareholders and boards of
directors and filing reports? Does it have its own office, telephone
number, stationery, assets, employees, business with others than the
parent?' Was it organized with adequate capitalization?24
Reflecting the equitable origins of the doctrine, a second
traditional prerequisite for "piercing" is a showing that the subsidiary
has been used as a shield to accomplish some fraudulent or unjust or
inequitable conduct for the benefit of the parent or controlling
shareholder. The conduct must be "morally culpable" or
"fundamentally unfair."' Commission of a tort, for example, does
not satisfy the standard.26
A final requisite, one frequently ignored in practice by the
courts, is that the defendant's conduct has to have caused an injury to
the plaintiff.27 Thus, some courts require a showing that the
subsidiary is insolvent or otherwise unable to satisfy a judgment?
21. See, e.g., Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1364 (10th Cir. 1974).
See generally BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 4, § 3.05.2.
22. Supra note 17.
23. See BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 4, § 20.12.
24. There is some ambivalence about the role of inadequate capitalization.
While all courts recognize that this is a factor of significance, some courts consider it
as a factor demonstrating lack of separate identity while others look upon it as a form
of wrongful or unjust conduct, particularly in tort matters.
25. E.g., Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984); Morris
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160-61 (N.Y. 1993); DeWitt
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
26. Isolated courts have identified torts as a wrong included in "wrongful
conduct" or "injustice." However, this view has been overwhelmingly rejected by a
majority of the courts. Otherwise, vicarious group liability for torts would always
arise on a showing of lack of separate identity and causation.
27. Supra note 17; infra note 28; see also Whitfield v. Bic Corp., 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26996 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 1994); Eckhaus v. Blauner, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9043 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1997); Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l,
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.
1993).
28. E.g., Ranger Enters., Inc. v. Leen & Assocs., Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
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These standards most readily apply, where they apply at all, to
closely held small corporations functioning without adequate legal
counsel. In the large public corporation, routinely operating under
the watchful eyes of "house counsel" reinforced by outside counsel,
violations of matters of form and lack of separate facilities,
equipment, operational and managerial staff are unlikely. With
counsel available, the traditional justifications for "piercing" are not
likely to occur. Furthermore, the standards are best suited for dealing
with private controversies. Their application to issues in which public
concerns play a major role becomes profoundly unsatisfying.
This is one of the most unsatisfactory areas of the law. With
hundreds of irreconcilable decisions and shifting rationales, it
functions in an almost inscrutable manner behind conclusory
metaphors such as "mere instrumentality," "sham," "adjunct,"
"agent," "alter ego," "puppet," or dozens of similarly murky terms.'
B. Common-Law Agency
This is the alternative route to the imposition of liability on a
parent corporation for acts of a subsidiary. In the parent-subsidiary
relationship, however, an agency relationship satisfying the common-
law requirements rarely arises. For an agency relationship, the
common law requires not merely "control" but also a consensual
transaction. The parties must agree that the subsidiary (if it is to be
an agent) is acting for the parent (the principal).' The acts of a
subsidiary acting as an agent are, from the legal point of view, the acts
of its parent corporation, and it is the parent that is liable. With
subsidiaries typically utilized to shield the parent corporation from
liability, it should be no surprise that very few parent/subsidiary
relationships satisfy the common law requirements for an "agency"
relationship. The other element, the dominant parent's "control"
over its subsidiary is, of course, readily satisfied, but proof of this
element in and of itself is insufficient. Indeed, as Learned Hand
23774 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 1998); HealthOne, Inc. v. Columbia Wesley Med. Ctr., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14857 (D. Kan. Aug. 22, 2000); Noto v. Cia Secula di Armanento,
310 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (alternative holding). See 13A WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCOPLEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 6318 (rev. perm. ed. 1984).
29. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §146
n.2 (3d ed. 1983); ELVIN R. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS
157 (1936).
30. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY (THIRD) § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 14,
2001).
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observed, if it were, every parent/subsidiary relationship would be an
agency relationship.3' In consequence, multinational liability under
the "agency" concept is most often an entirely unpromising remedy.
In most cases, "piercing the veil" with all its limitations remains the
sole conceptual basis for imposition of vicarious liability on
multinationals for the acts of the group.
Although "piercing" is an ineffective basis for the imposition of
responsibility on multinational parents for the activities of their
subsidiaries, it cannot be entirely dismissed. Notwithstanding the
inherent conceptual difficulties, the courts in hundreds of cases,
perhaps motivated by the serious consequences of a ritualistic
application of the doctrine, have, nevertheless, imposed "piercing"
liability on corporate parent corporations. While most of these
decisions involved smaller corporations, the body of jurisprudence
has useful value, not only in providing some deterrence of corporate
conduct, but for litigation itself in appropriate cases. However, it
usually proves to be a less than useful remedy.
C. "Piercing" Jurisprudence in Statutory Matters
When one moves from private controversies at common law to
matters in which public concerns play a major role, as in the
application of statutory regulatory law, the prospects of "piercing"
may be brighter. In the past, the federal courts had made
considerable progress in fashioning a newer jurisprudence better
adapted to the implementation of the underlying objectives of federal
regulatory and remedial legislation.
In numerous decisions, the courts had refashioned the "piercing"
doctrines developed in cases involving common law controversies
involving private parties for use in cases in the statutory area where
questions of important public policy were at stake. Thus, a series of
Supreme Court decisions have brushed aside the traditional doctrine
to achieve implementation of statutory programs in the face of
complex corporate structures." Other decisions substantially watered
down the rigorous traditional requirements for "piercing" in matters
of statutory application. They developed a form of "modified
31. Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d
Cir. 1929); Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24,32-33 (Ala. 1980).
32. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-66, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804
(1944); Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1946) (per
curiam); cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 622, 633-34 (1983).
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piercing" under which matters of corporate form became less
important, and the search for a fraudulent or wrongful or unjust or
inequitable outcome generally was ignored.3 They imposed statutory
liability on parent corporations for violations of their subsidiaries in
order to implement the underlying objectives and policies of the
regulatory and remedial program; to prevent evasion by manipulation
of the corporate structure, as by organization of subsidiaries to
conduct the activity proscribed for the parent; and to prevent
frustration of the legislative purpose. In the end, the courts that
broadened the scope of the statutory regulatory programs to embrace
the entire enterprise, of which the violating company was only a part,
were proceeding out of a sense of judicial responsibility to go beyond
the text (or lack of text) of a statute to fill in gaps and lacunae and
otherwise make statutory systems work.4 These developments gave
strong hopes that with the passage of time, enterprise concepts would
become more widely accepted where necessary to implement
statutory programs.
Whether this process will continue is far from clear. First, in the
area of statutory construction generally, recent decisions of the
Supreme Court have emphasized strict construction and the
governing role of the text. In the employment statutory area, in
particular, they have been insistent on confirming the common law
definition of "employee," rejecting earlier decisions extending
statutory remedial provisions to protect other workers not meeting
the common law definition test.3" Recent decisions, including the
33. See, e.g., Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1982)
(applying modified "piercing" doctrine) (as amended); Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same); SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp., 620 F. Supp.
231, 234 (D. Nev. 1985) (same); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F.
Supp. 1021, 1039 (N.D. Ohio 1981) ("Thus corporate formalities cannot be used to
circumvent a statutory policy.").
34. See BLUMBERG, LCG-IV, supra note 4, §§ 1.02.3-.6.
35. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Patterson v.
Shumate, 505 U.S. 1239 (1992); cf. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164
(1994). But cf United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,713 (1947) (noting the content of a
statutory term in the context of a particular federal statute was a federal problem "to
be construed in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained").
The movement towards strict construction has been strongly criticized. See
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749
(1995); Melvin Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 13 (1995); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 621 (1990).
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Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bestfoods36 and a series of
decisions in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit37
emphasizing the controlling role of traditional corporation law and
"piercing the veil jurisprudence" raise further doubts as to the role of
enterprise concepts in this area.
In United States v. Bestfoods, the Supreme Court held that the
imposition of vicarious liability on a parent corporation for its
subsidiary's treatment of hazardous wastes in violation of the
Superfund provision of the Comprehensive Environmental
Responsibility and Compensation Act38 was possible only in the event
of compliance with the traditional veil-piercing requirements.
Numerous Courts of Appeals had reached a contrary construction of
the statute. They had relied on the fundamental policy of the
Superfund provisions that broad liability for cleaning of contaminated
property was critical to implementation of the statutory public
policy.39 In its decision in Bestfoods, the Court ignored this statutory
policy. At the same time, it also ignored the line of decisions
discussed above that had rejected "piercing" as the appropriate
standard or applied a modified "piercing" jurisprudence based on
implementation of statutory policies and prevention of evasion
through the use of complex corporate structures. °
While the Court recognized in Bestfoods that the parent
corporation would be directly liable for its own participation in the
proscribed activity, it held irrelevant that the executives responsible
were the very persons who were its own officers and directors. These
36. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
37. E.g., Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999); Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 1999).
38. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1625 (1986).
39. They included the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits and a number of district courts. See United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991);
Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water
Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper
& Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992); United
States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 1995) ("arranger" liability);
Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993).
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits disagreed. See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co.,
893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th
Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51
(1998).
40. See supra notes 32, 33.
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individuals were, in addition, the officers and directors of the
subsidiary. The Court accepted the reasoning of some of the courts
wedded to traditional entity law that such an overlap was entirely
irrelevant so long as the individuals were acting in their capacity as
officers of the subsidiary at the time;4' in the unhappy imagery
employed in this area, the issue was which official "hat" they were
wearing at the time.42
In view of these barriers to imposition of vicarious liability on
corporate groups, it is not without significance that in some of the
major recent litigations both in the United Kingdom and in the
United States against multinational corporations, counsel has avoided
the inherent difficulties of satisfying "piercing" standards. Instead,
they have proceeded on the theory of the parent corporation's direct
role in causing the injury complained of.43 Where this can be shown,
"piercing" and the role of the subsidiary, of course, become
irrelevant.
D. Legislative Efforts for Group Accountability
Traditional entity law created serious barriers not only to suits in
the courts seeking to achieve corporate accountability through
imposition of liability on parent corporations for acts of their
subsidiaries in carrying on the work of the enterprise. For decades,
traditional concepts of the corporation presented substantial
obstacles to statutory regulatory efforts as well. Thus, until new
legislative techniques successfully sidestepping these limitations were
at last developed in 1933, prior legislative efforts to impose national
policy on areas of the economy had proved almost completely
ineffective. These statutes proved ineffective because their scope was
defined in narrow entity terms. For example, statutes regulating the
railroads applied only to corporations meeting the definition of
41. 524 U.S. at 68-70.
42- But see United States v. Sealey, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353 (1967) ("[W]e are
moved by the identity of the persons who act, rather than the label of their hats.").
For discussion of the "hats" theory, see BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 4, §1.02.1
(cited by the Court) and BLUMBERG, LCG-III, supra note 4, § 29.02 (criticizing the
"hats" theory) (not cited by the Court).
43. E.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Jota v.
Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
Comparable developments in England include Connolly v. RTZ Corp., 3 W.L.R.
373 (H.L. 1997) and Sithole v. Thor Chems. Holdings Ltd., No. JC 98 647, 779, 798
(Q.B.D. July 31,1998).
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"carriers."" The World War I Trading with the Enemy Act applied
only to "corporations incorporated" or "doing business" in the
territory of the enemy.45
These statutes were readily evaded by organizing and operating a
subsidiary not meeting the statutory definition to conduct the activity
prohibited by the statute for the parent corporation. Thus, the
railroads evaded the so-called "commodity" clause prohibiting
transportation of products of their own manufacture or mining, such
as steel or coal, through subsidiaries that operated the steel or coal
concessions in question. 6 Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the
World War I Trading with the Enemy Act applied only to
corporations organized under American law and had no application
to corporations organized under the laws of other countries even
though wholly owned by enemy nationals.
This unhappy period of statutory impotence came to an end with
the first Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. Recognizing the
conceptual barrier erected by the courts, the draftsmen of the early
New Deal reform statutes, such as the Securities Act of 1933, 4s the
Securities & Exchange Act of 1934,49 the Emergency Railroad Act of
1933,50 and the Public Utility Holding Company of 1935,"1
resourcefully solved the conceptual difficulty. The scope of the
statutes and administrative regulations were defined in functional, not
conceptual terms. They did so through the introduction of the
concept of "control" and the imposition of liability on "controlling"
persons for statutory violations of members of the group." Concepts
44. 34 Stat. 584 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (superseded).
45. 40 Stat. 41 (1917), 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 et seq. (1994).
46. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 257, 272-73 (1911); United
States v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 516, 526, 528-30 (1915); United
States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 60-63 (1920); United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E.
Ry., 298 U.S. 492, 506, 512 (1936); United States v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 771
(1948).
47. Hamburg-Am. Line Terminal & Navigation Co. v. United States, 277 U.S.
138 (1928); Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457 (1925). But cf Daimler Co. v.
Cont'l Tyre & Rubber Co., [1916] 2 App. Cas. 307, 336-48 (upholding application of
comparable British statute to British company owned by Germans).
48. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994).
49. Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994).
50. Emergency Railroad Act of 1933 § 5(2), (4), 48 Stat. 217 (1933); 54 Stat. 905,
907-08 (1940).
51. Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 § 2(7), (8), (11), 15
U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7), (8), (11) (1994).
52. E.g., Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(8), 781, 78m
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of the corporate juridical personality and "piercing" standards which
had previously frustrated effective statutory implementation became
irrelevant.
The standard for "control" was functional and concerned with
the realities. Even less-than-majority stock ownership, while
relevant, was not decisive. Statutes could no longer be evaded by
corporate manipulation. Thus, some statutes and implementing
regulations using the "control" standard even fastened on stock
ownership as low as five percent 3 or ten percent (in the absence of
larger bloc in other hands)' to give rise to a rebuttable presumption
of "control" and upon stock ownership of twenty-five percent55 of the
outstanding shares to give rise to a conclusive presumption.
As the doctrine of "control" matured, it was further strengthened
by expansion of the sweep of liability so that it included not only the
corporation "controlling" the corporation violating the statute (the
parent corporation) but also the corporations that were "controlled
by" the violator (subsidiaries), as well as corporations that were
"under common control" with the violator (sister subsidiaries and
affiliates)." Congress has since repeatedly used the functional
definition of "control" to expand the scope of regulatory programs in
numerous far reaching programs, including the Bank Holding
Company Act,.7 the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 8 and
the recent Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act authoring financial holding
companies. The states have done the same with numerous insurance
regulatory statutes based on the Model Insurance Holding Company
System Regulatory Acte and other statutes, particularly those
(1994); Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 219(a) (1994); Bank
Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1), (5) (1994); Savings
& Loan Holding Company Act (SLHCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1462(4) (1994).
53. PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(11) (1994) ("affiliate"); BHCA, 12 U.S.C. §
1841(a)(3), (4) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 225.31(d)(2)(i) (2000).
54. PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7), (8) (1994) ("holding company" and
"subsidiary company").
55. BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 225.31(d)(2)(ii) (1994).
56. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a); SLHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1462(9) (1994); Investment
Company Act §§ 2(a)(40), 56(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(40), 80a-56(e) (1994);
General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. 230.144(a)(1)
(2000).
57. 70 Stat. 133 (1956); 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (1994).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a) (1994).
59. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1388 (1999) (codified in various sections of
titles 12, 15, 16, and 18 of the United States Code).
60. 3 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MODEL
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regulating the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages61 and the
conduct of gambling enterprises.62
Still another notable jurisprudential development has occurred in
the American statutory area. After the National Labor Relations
Board fashioned a revolutionary "integrated enterprise" doctrine to
determine the scope of statutory regulation under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) dealing with collective bargaining,' the courts
did not stop at upholding the validity of the standard.' They went
further and applied the doctrine, not only for the purposes of the
NLRA, but for numerous other federal statutes in the areas of
employment and anti-discrimination.65
Congress itself has made repeated use of the "integrated
enterprise" standard in a series of amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,66 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act67 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.' Enacting the very
formulation used by the courts and agencies in the labor and
employment fields, Congress relied on "integrated enterprise" to
extend overseas the protection for Americans against discrimination
provided by the three statutes. Where an "integrated enterprise"
could be shown, the statutes applied to Americans employed
overseas, either by American parent corporations or their foreign
subsidiaries as well.
One further example of the use of the concept of "control" to
impose group liability on American parent corporations for the acts
INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT, MODEL LAWS,
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 440-41 (1996). This has been substantially enacted
in many states. Id. at 440-43. See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 4, at ch. 7.
61. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 15 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
311.260 (West Supp. 1993). See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 4, at ch. 12.
62. E.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-1 et seq. (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
463.010 et seq. (Michie 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 et seq. (West 1988 & Supp.
1993). See BLUMBERG, LCG-VI, supra note 4, at ch. 13.
63. 21 NLRB ANNUAL REPort 14 (1956).
64. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam).
65. These have included Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See, e.g., Chaiffetz v. Robertson
Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 1986); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711
F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1983). Contra Papa v. Katy Indus., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.
1999).
66. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
67. Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984), 9 U.S.C. § 623(h) (1994).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
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of their foreign subsidiaries may be useful. In a statute drafted with
rare sophistication, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act69 has been
successfully applied to foreign subsidiaries of American corporations
and thereby applied to the full range of multinational abuses such as
bribery of foreign officials or illegal political contributions, whether
done by American parent corporations or their foreign subsidiaries.
As the success of the American statute became apparent and the
serious threat to the international order presented by governmental
corruption more fully appreciated, the world community itself was
moved to proceed against these evils. The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act no longer stands alone. It has been joined by the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in
International Business Transactions; the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption; and the European Union Convention
criminalizing the bribery of officials of the Union or its member
states, as well as by national statutes, such as those in Britain and
Australia implementing the international understandings. In
addition, the World Bank, its affiliates, and the International
Monetary Fund have taken steps towards eliminating corruption in
projects financed by them."
Where statutory liability rests on "control" rather than upon a
description framed in entity terms such as "incorporated in the
United States," "railroad," or an "owner" or "operator," statutes
operate efficiently and bring all elements of corporate groups within
their scope. Traditional concepts of corporation law based on entity
law and the severe limitations of "piercing the veil" remedy are no
longer relevant. The usefulness of corporate manipulation to prevent
implementation of the statutory purpose comes to an end.
Thus, legislative reform can readily provide the answer to the
conceptual weaknesses of corporate jurisprudence as applied by the
courts. It can readily serve as an adequate framework for assuring
multinational accountability. The problems arise elsewhere in the
political process and the great difficulties of developing the necessary
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 781, 78o (1994).
70. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)16/FINAL
(1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/20novle.htm (Dec. 17, 1997); Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.K/XXXIV.1CICOR/doc.14/96
(1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 724, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treatiesfb-58.html (Mar. 29, 1996). See Stuart H.
Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 32 INT'L LAW. 463,466-67 (1998).
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political support for corporate reform. For example, the problem of
illegal foreign campaign contributions and bribery of public officials
had to become a well-publicized and well-documented national
scandal affecting some of the country's largest corporations7' before
Congress responded with the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. It is likely that scandals of similar magnitude will be
required before legislative reforms become a realistic possibility.
H. An Unexplored Alternative
The existing legal system thus presents serious barriers.
Corrective legislation aside, there nevertheless remains another
promising, substantially unexplored, legal route to achieve increased
accountability over the multinational corporation through use of the
judicial process. This is increased reliance on direct actions against
the senior American corporate personnel responsible for the
corporate activities in question. Such litigation can rest on
established principles of basic tort law. It would present none of the
difficulties presented by entity concepts to the imposition of vicarious
liability or to the problems presented by the attempted assertion of
derivative jurisdiction over foreign affiliates by reason of the activities
of a local affiliate. In brief, where an individual commits a tort, he or
she is personally liable. It is irrelevant for such liability that the tort is
committed by the individual in his or her capacity as a corporate
officer or employee or that the offense is done for the benefit of the
corporation.'
Since litigation against individual American officers and
directors does not directly concern the American multinational
parent or the subsidiary, it sidesteps entirely the problems presented
by actions against foreign subsidiaries. Those difficulties arise from
the traditional legal barriers to vicarious liability and difficulties of
achieving jurisdiction. If successful, liability, of course, would be
71. See, e.g., John J. McCloy et al., Report of the Special Review Committee of the
Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation, filed in SEC v. Gulf Oil Corp., No. 75-
0324 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1975); Edward G. Harness et al., Exxon Corp., Determination
and Report of the Special Committee on Litigation, Jan. 23, 1976; Max M. Fisher et al.,
Report of the Special Investigation Committee of the Board of Directors of United
Brands Co.,filed in SEC v. United Brands Co., No. 75-0509 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 1976).
72. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) ("An agent who
does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved of liability by the fact that he acted ... on
account of the principal.... "); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (rev. perm. ed. 1994).
[Vol. 24:297
2001) The Barriers Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity 317
imposed only on the individuals involved; the companies of the
multinational group would not be bound. However, this is not the
end of the matter. In order to recruit and retain its overseas
executive force to direct the affairs of its foreign subsidiaries, the
multinational is under great, perhaps irresistible, pressure to assume
responsibility for the judgments and to indemnify the individuals in
question.
There is a further advantage. At a minimum, the litigation would
provide a judicial inquiry into the realities of the behavior of the
multinational under examination. Such litigation would not only
expose the conduct of the multinational officials to the glare of the
public scene. A judgment of the court sustaining the allegations of
the complaint would also provide a definitive judicial evaluation of
the conduct.73 Further, unless the multinational enterprise disavows
the actions of its own officials done in furtherance of its business
objectives, it inevitably must play a role in defending the lawsuit, even
if only behind the scenes. In such event under the established
principles of issue preclusion, the facts found in the suit in the
judgment against the officials would be binding in any further
litigation against the multinational parent or subsidiary alike for the
abuses in question74 when and as American jurisdiction may be
established over the foreign subsidiary. This alternative route to
achieving multinational accountability appears to have sufficient
promise to merit serious consideration.
M1. Enterprise Liability in American Common Law
Aside from the corporation law, in recent decades American
common law has experienced a highly significant acceptance of
enterprise liability in isolated areas, primarily tort law. Of these,
product liability is the outstanding example. Older concepts have
been simply swept aside with liability to the ultimate consumer
imposed on all parties involved in providing dangerously defective
goods to consumers. The sweep of liability includes all those
involved: designer, manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, and retailer.
Parties are liable even though they had only bought and resold
products without any history of defects that were in sealed containers.
73. Cf. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(noting that evidence suggested defendant knew of practice of forced labor on
project in question).
74. See BLUMBERG, LCG-I, supra note 4, § 11.03.2.
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Corporate affiliation between the parties, a factor of some
significance in the last days of the waning older law, became
irrelevant. Corporate factors and entity concepts, similarly, became
irrelevant.
In the wake of the product liability revolution, its procedural
counterpart, the "stream of commerce" concept emerged. This
subjects to local jurisdiction foreign manufacturers exploiting the
local market with a substantial amount of local sales so that the
possibility of litigation should have been reasonably anticipated. It
does so although the foreign manufacturer has no assets, employees,
or affiliate in the forum. As with product liability, corporate
affiliation between the foreign manufacturer and the American
distribution chain is unnecessary. In an interesting development,
"stream of commerce," originally confined to product liability, has
been applied to allow American courts to assume jurisdiction of
controversies in very different matters, including breach of contract
cases and warranty infringement causing economic loss, as well as
patent and copyright infringement cases.7'
Another interesting development is the emergence of the
"continuation of the enterprise" doctrine in successor liability matters
in asset-acquisition transactions. This has been widely applied in
statutory matters. Its acceptance at common law has been much
more limited, but does include adoption by two of the most important
industrial states in the nation: Michigan and Ohio. Without requiring
continuance of shareholders as in the older law, this innovative
doctrine imposes successor liability wherever the successor essentially
continued the business, as with the same plant, employees, and
products. In brief, notwithstanding the use of new corporate forms,
the liabilities of the business run with the business. The economic
realities, not legal forms, control. 6
Conclusion
Multinational enterprises typically conduct their overseas
business through subsidiaries organized in the countries in which they
are operating. Where this occurs, any multinational conduct giving
rise to complaint is the conduct of the foreign subsidiary, not of the
multinational group, under the established principles of traditional
doctrines of corporation law and of "piercing the veil jurisprudence."
75. See BLUMBERG, LCO-I, supra note 4, §§ 5.12a, 5.12b (Supp. 2000).
76. See BLUMBERG, LCG-I supra note 4, §§ 20.05-.11.
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As a result, the imposition of vicarious liability on American
multinational parent corporations for the conduct of their foreign
subsidiaries becomes difficult.
In summary, serious barriers exist to achieving corporate
accountability through application of existing legal standards to
multinational enterprises. National legislation and international
convention present obvious routes to reform. Litigation, with all its
difficulties, can achieve improvement in some areas, such as where
the multinational parent contrary to the usual pattern is itself directly
participating in the conduct in question. This emphasizes the
importance of proceeding as well with activities that, while entirely
lawful, do not rest on the law, but are directed to altering the climate
of opinion.
In contrast to the barriers presented by outworn corporate
jurisprudence and the practical difficulties of achieving immediate
legislative reform, the meta-legal pressures for achieving corporate
social responsibility used in the past continue as an additional area for
consideration. Organized efforts of consumers to harness market
pressures on producers of consumer goods; consumer boycotts; moral
pressures on corporate leadership; programs of recognition for
business leaders demonstrating commitment to social objectives;
encouragement of codes of self-regulation with adequate systems for
determining and evaluating compliance so as to achieve meaningful
credibility; shareholder proposals; and investor support of social
justice portfolios have a common element. They influence the
climate of opinion and collectively bring continuing pressures leading
to step-by-step improvement of corporate standards. They inevitably
have to be taken into account in corporate decision-making. With
adverse public attitudes at risk, corporations seeking to maximize
their performance are under pressure to comply. Market economics
are being harnessed to support social responsibility, rather than being
allowed to serve as the barrier trumpeted by some economists.'
The difficulties facing the judicial and legislative routes to
achieving multinational accountability render even more desirable
measures directed at maximizing market and social pressures to
achieve increased multinational accountability. Building on past
successes in the area, these pressures offer an alternative opportunity
to achieve meaningful, if gradual and limited, improvement. In this
77. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32.
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fashion, those seeking this goal can most usefully change the climate
of opinion; and in the end it is the climate of opinion that will
determine both the future responses of the legal system and the
conduct of multinationals themselves.
